Medicine and pneumatology: Henry More, Richard Baxter, and Francis Glisson's Treatise on the Energetic Nature of Substance. by Henry, J
Medical History, 1987, 31: 15-40.
MEDICINE AND PNEUMATOLOGY: HENRY MORE,
RICHARD BAXTER, AND FRANCIS GLISSON'S
TREATISE ON THE ENERGETIC NATURE OF
SUBSTANCE
by
JOHN HENRY*
The nature of the soul and its relationship to the body has always proved
problematical forChristian philosophy. Thesourceofthedifficultycanbetracedback
to the efforts of the early Fathers to reconcile the essentially pagan concept of an
immaterial andimmortal soul with apostolic teachings about the after-life in which all
the emphasis is placed upon the resurrection ofthe body. The tensions between these
two traditions inevitably became strained during the sixteenth century when
Protestant reformers insisted on a closer adherence to Scripture. Furthermore, even
when leaving the problems ofScriptural hermeneutics aside, the dualistic approach to
thequestion, in which soul (orspirit) and body are held to becategorically different in
essence, had to overcome a number ofintractable philosophical problems. So, it was
not simply coincidence that when the new mechanical philosophy began to be
formulatedinasystematicwayintheseventeenthcentury, itwascouchedinvigorously
dualistic terms. In fact, three of the earliest fully elaborated systems of mechanical
philosophy, those of Descartes, Digby, and Charleton, were explicitly intended to
provide a philosophical prop for dualist theology.' Moreover, it was because of its
usefulness in promoting dualism that Cartesianism was first popularized in England
not by a natural philosopher but by the Cambridge Platonist and theologian, Henry
More.2
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I The literature regarding Descartes is vast but for a very recent treatment see Richard B. Carter,
Descartes'medicalphilosophy: the organic solution to themind-bodyproblem, Baltimore Md., and London,
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. Sir Kenelm Digby's intentions are made clear in the title ofhis new
system ofphilosophy: Two treatises. In the one ofwhich the nature ofbodies; in the other the nature ofmans
souleislookedinto: in wayofthediscoveryoftheimmortality ofreasonablesoules, Paris, G. Blaizot, 1644. But
see also John Henry, 'Atomism and eschatology: Catholicism and natural philosophy in the Interregnum',
Br. J. Hist. Sci., 1982, 15: 211-239. Walter Charleton's major work, Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-
Charltoniana, London, T. Newcomb forT. Heath, 1654, isdescribed on the title-page as "the first part" and
heannounces hisintention towriteasecondpart on the natureofthesoul at theendofthe book, p.479. This
neverappeared in its intended form, but see W. Charleton, The immortality o.fthe human souldemonstrated
by the light ofnature. In two dialogues, London, W. Wilson for H. Herringman, 1657.
2 Here again the literature is extensive, but all earlier works areeffectively superseded by Alan Gabbey,
'Philosophia Cartesiana triumphata: Henry More (1646-1671)', in T. M. Lennon, J. M. Nicholas, and J. W.
Davis (editors), Problems ofCartesianism, Kingston and Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1982,
pp. 171-250.
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In spite ofthis powerful support, however, there were still those who regarded the
dichotomy between soul and body, so essential to dualism, as fundamentally inimical
to any satisfactory explanation ofpsychosomatic interaction. Accordingly, monistic
solutions to this problem also attracted some formidable advocates. Certainly, the
greatest of these were the materialist Thomas Hobbes, the hylotheist Baruch de
Spinoza, and the vitalist Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. But monistic pneumatology also
found allies in a well-established tradition ofmedical thought. In a series ofarticles,
D. P. Walker has shown the links between medical concepts of "spirit" and
materialistic views ofthe human soul, while Walter Pagel has underlined the monistic
pneumatology oftwo ofthe leadingmedical theorists in seventeenth-century England,
William Harvey and Francis Glisson.3
Thecrucial nature oftheensuingdebate between dualists and monists is revealed by
the reaction ofthat champion ofCartesian dualism, Henry More. As is well known,
More lost no time in publishing adetailed attack on Hobbes's Decorpore(1655) in his
The immortality ofthe soul(1659), and in the 1670s, he turned his attention to the new
threats, Cartesian atheism and Spinozism.4 However, what has hardly been noticed
before is that More also wrote a refutation of Francis Glisson's Tractatus de natura
substantiae energetica (1672).5
Glisson's Treatise deserves recognition as one of the most original systems of
philosophy to appear in the second halfofthe seventeenth century and as one ofthe
most profound attempts to develop a monistic solution to the mind-body problem.
One reason for the failure ofintellectual historians to recognize its importance stems
from the commonly held belief that it had absolutely no influence upon Glisson's
contemporaries. The aim of this paper is to make a start towards correcting this
erroneousview. Glisson'sphilosophy, asexpressed in the Treatise, is rich,complex and
3 D. P. Walker, 'The astral body in Renaissance medicine', J. WarburgandCourtauldInstitutes, 1958,21:
119-133; idem, 'Medical spirits in philosophy and theology from Ficino to Newton', in Arts du spectacle et
histoire des ides. Recueil offert en hommage a Jean Jacquot, Tours, Centre d'Etudes Superieures de Ia
Renaissance, 1984, pp. 287-300; idem 'Medical spirits and God and the soul', in M. Fattori and M. Bianchi
(editors), Spiritus. IV° Colloquio interna-zionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, Rome, 7-9 gennaio, 1983,
Rome, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1984, pp. 233-244. The first two ofthese are now reprinted in D. P. Walker,
Music, spirit and language in the Renaissance, London, Variorum Reprints, 1985. For related material see
also D. P. Walker, Spiritualanddemonic magic from Ficino to Campanella, London, Warburg Institute, 1958.
On monism in Harvey and Glisson see Walter Pagel, 'Harvey and Glisson on irritability with a note on Van
Helmont', Bull. Hist. Med., 1967, 41: 497-514; idem, 'The reaction to Aristotle in seventeenth-century
biological thought', in E. A. Underwood (editor), Science, medicine and historv: essat.s on the evolution of
scientific thought andmedicalpractice written in honour ofCharles Singer, London, Oxford University Press,
1953, pp. 489-509; and idem, Joan Baptista van Helmont: reformer of science and medicine, Cambridge
University Press, 1982, pp. 120-123.
4 Henry More, The immortality o.fthe soul so far forth as it is demonstrable from the light of nature,
London, James Flesher for William Morden, 1659. For More's concern with Cartesian formsofatheism see
Gabbey, op. cit., note 2above; forhis reactions toSpinoza see R. L. Colie, Lightandenlightenment: astudyl of
the Cambridge Platonists and the Dutch Arminians, Cambridge University Press, 1957; idem, 'Spinoza in
England, 1665-1730', Proc. Amer. Philos. Soc., 1963, 107: 183-219, especially pp. 183-193; and Sarah
Hutton, 'Reason and revelation in the Cambridge Platonists and their reception ofSpinoza', in K. Grrnder
and W. Schmidt-Biggemann (editors), Spinoza in der Friihzeit seinerreligiosen Wirkung, Heidelberg. Verlag
Lambert Schneider, 1984, pp. 181-200.
5 Francis Glisson, Tractatus le natura substantiae energetica, seu de vita naturae, eiusque tribu.s primis
facultatibus, 1. perceptiva naturalibus, I. appetitiva naturalibus, III. motiva naturalibus & (., London, E.
Flesher for H. Brome and N. Hooke, 1672.
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subtle, andmanages to beinnovatorywhiledrawing heavily upon scholastic traditions
and Renaissance philosophical eclecticism. A full exposition ofhis philosophy has yet
to be attempted and isnotwithin the scopeofthisessay.6 Here, wewill look atGlisson
only as he appeared to Henry More and Richard Baxter, two of the leading
contemporary English theologians, who explicity dealt with his theories. While
considering the background to and the reasons for their interest in Glisson it will
becomeclearthatmedical theories frequently had aprofound influence on philosophy
and theology in the early modern period. Before embarking on this, however, it is
important to recognize the intimate connexion between Glisson's new system of
natural philosophy and his medical concerns, and to this we will turn first.
FRANCIS GLISSON'S MEDICAL PHILOSOPHY
Glisson's output in print is not extensive, and there is a clear continuity ofinterests
and themes runningthrough hispublishedworks. Thecontinuity ismostclearbetween
theAnatomiahepatisof1654and hisnextmedical treatise, the Tractatusde ventriculoet
intestinisof 1677. However, asTemkin and Pagel havepointed out, therearea number
ofnotions employed by Glisson in his early efforts to understand the nature ofrickets
which foreshadow his later ideas. Temkin has traced Glisson's concept ofirritability,
most famously expounded in De ventriculo, to his description of the pulse in De
rachitide: as the arteries thrust blood into the parts of the body there is a certain
resistance which "provokes" or "irritates" the heart and arteries into increasing the
pressure. A strong pulse will not be found, therefore, where resistance is low, as in the
rachitic. Pagel, on the other hand, has pointed to Glisson's early use ofthe concept of
"tension" or "tone" in the nerves to account for both sense and locomotion. By
brooding on the notion ofirritation and the role ofthe nerves in this process Glisson
6 Glisson has been accorded a numberofbrieftreatments, some ofthem verygood, but he has not so far
beenconsidered more fully. Anexcellent starting place isOwsei Temkin'sarticleonGlisson in theDictionary
o.f Scientfic Biography (DSB) but consider also Pagel's papers cited in note 3 above and any of the
following. Kurt Sprengel, Versuch einer pragmatischen Geschichte der Arzneikunde, 5 vols., Halle. J. J.
Gebamer, 1803, vol. 5, pp. 105-109. C. Daremberg, Histoire des sciences medicales, comprenant I'anatonmie,
laphysiologie, la medecine, la chirurgie et les doctrines depathologie generale, 2 vols., Paris, J.-B Bailliere,
1870, vol. 2, pp. 640-649 and 650-672; C.F.M. de Remusat, Histoire de laphilosophie en Angleterre depuis
Baconjusqu'a Locke, 2 vols., Paris, Didier, 1875, vol. 2, pp. 163-168; Owsei Temkin, 'The classical roots of
Glisson'sdoctrine ofirritation', Bull. Hist. Med., 1964,38:297-328; R. MilnesWalker, 'FrancisGlisson and
his capsule', Ann. R. Coll. Surg. Engl, 1966, 38: 71-91; Audrey B. Davis, 'Some implications of the
circulation theory for disease theory and treatment in the seventeenth century', J. Hist. Med., 1971, 26:
28-39; idem, 'Thecirculation ofthe bloodand chemical anatomy', in A. G. Debus (editor), Science, medicine
and society in the Renaissance: essays in honour of Walter Pagel, 2 vols., New York, Science History
Publications, 1972, vol. 2, pp. 25-37; Nikolaus Mani, 'Biomedical thought in Glisson's hepatology and in
Wepfer's work on apoplexy', in Lloyd G. Stevenson (editor), A celebration of medical histori, Baltimore
Md., and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, pp. 37-63. Jeffrey Boss, '"Doctrina de
circulatione sanguinis haud immutat antiquam medendi methodum". An unpublished manuscript (1662) by
Francis Glisson (1597-1677) on implications of Harvey's physiology', Phli.sis, 1978, 20: 309-336; and idem.
'Helmont, Glisson, and the doctrine of the common reservoir in the seventeenth-century revolution in
physiology', Br. J. Hist. Sci., 1983,63: 261-272. Perhaps it is also worth pointing out in this connection that
Glisson himself said that the full details of his system were not worked out. He suggested that the Royal
Society might be called upon to perfect and complete it. See Glisson, op. cit., note 5 above, Epi.stola
dedicatoria (to the Earl ofShaftesbury), sig. air. The present author iscurrently working on Glisson and his
significance and hopes to add to this literature in the future; this essay is very much a preliminary sortie.
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was eventually led to his mature concept ofirritability, in which all fibres in the body
are said to be "irritable" even without the mediation of nerves.7
Glisson's first prolonged efforts, in Anatomia hepatis, to define the nature of
"irritability" as a biological phenomenon presupposed that nervous sensibility in the
irritated part was a sine qua non. "All irritation", he wrote, "indicates the existence of
perception", and that, in turn, indicates the presence of nerves.8 Glisson considered
different kinds of "irritation" which could activate particular nerves and so lead to
bodily changes or movements. The nerves responded to three kinds of activation:
perception or sensation, appetite, and muscular movement. This, as Temkin has
shown, was entirely in accord with Galen's teachings about the threefold purpose of
thenerves: sensibility in the organs ofperception, initiation ofmovement in the organs
of locomotion, and in all other organs "the recognition of distressing things"
(equivalent to Glisson's concept of appetite).9
Glisson developed these ideas in anatomical lectures delivered to the Royal College
ofPhysicians shortly after thepublication ofhis book on the liver. In his lecture on the
brain, Glisson averred that its actions and uses consisted "in the exercise of its noble
faculties, perception, appetite and motion". 10 He seems to have had no difficulty in
locating the faculties of perception and appetite in the brain and he felt confident,
therefore, in locating the motive faculty in the same organ:
For if it be the braine wch perceives, it must be the braine also wch desires & the same wch
prosecutes that desire. For thedesire were in vaine, ifthe braine had noe power to move toward a
prosecution of the same, & there would be noe animall motion, if the braine had no power to
command it.tI
However, although Glisson was convinced that the motive faculty is located in the
brain, he was all too aware ofthedifficulty ofexplaining the operation ofthis faculty:
the manner how this power or faculty is put in execution, is soe obscure & harde to be conceived,
thattheminde reflecting upon it selfe,cannot clearly trace its owne footstepps. It is hard indeed to
follow the track ofthe idaea's [sic] from the outward senses to the braine, but much more difficult
to trace the edicts ofthe braine back againe to the outward organs of motion, yet this in nature
must be done.12
Abandoningall pretence to "aclear account ofthis", Glisson merely offered "some
propositionsaboutit". Thefirstoftheseis thatthebraincould onlyexcite the nerves to
initiate motion by means of its own motion:
7 F. Glisson, Anatomia hepatis, cuipraemittuntur quaedam adrem anatomicam universe spectantia et, ad
calcem operis, subjiciuntur nonnulla de lvmphae ductibus nuper repertis, London, 0. Pullein, 1654; idem,
Tractatusde ventriculo et intestinis. Cuipraemittitur alliusdepartibus continentibus ingenere; & inspecie, deiis
abdominis, London, E. F. for Henry Brome, 1677; F. Glisson, G. Bates, and A. Regemorter, De rachitide.
sivemorbopuerili, qui vulgo the rickets dicitur, London, G. Du-Gardi for L. Sadler and R. Beaumont. 1650. 1
have used the English Translation ofthe latter, A treatiseof the rickets: being a disease common to children,
London, Peter Cole, 1651, see ch.10, especially pp. 86-88, discussed in Temkin, op. cit., note 6 above, p. 294,
and ch. 7, pp. 57-71 and ch. 14, pp. 144--150, discussed in Pagel (1967), op. cit., note 3 above, p. 499.
8 Glisson, Anatomia hepatis, ch. 44, p. 397, and ch. 30, pp. 262 266. See Temkin, op. cit.. note 6 above.
p. 295; and B. L. Ullman, 'Glisson on gall bladder pain', J. Hist. Med., 1955, 10:112- 113.
9 Temkin, op. cit., note 6 above, p. 302.
In British Library, Sloane MS 3306, f.157.
l Ibid., f.l63. Glisson discussed perception ff.157-62, ff.162-3, and motion ff.163 -6.
12 Ibid., f.163.
18Medicine andpneumatology
For it is not conceivable, how the nerves should be excited, or they excite the muscles to worke
according to the minde ofthe braine, ifthey were by no acte ofthe braine to give a signall to the
nerves & outward organs; that acte must be some kinde of motion in the braine itself. For the
braine cannot move the nerves, either by its perception or appetite, because those are both
immament actions & cannot reache any thinge with out their owne subject.'3
Thesecondpropositionwasthatthebrain's "imperiall kindeofmandate" tothenerves
"proceedes noe further, then to the grosse commande ofsuch or such an action to be
done".
Fora beast which also may make such an animall motion, knows not soe much, as that he hath a
braine or nerves or muscles. Wherefore, the braine cannot give a particular command to every
nerve or muscle, when it excites a motion. But it is content with the giving such a generall
excitation, that such a motion may be made. And upon such excitation, the nerves excite the
muscles propper, whereby the motion is affected.14
The role of the brain in initiating the movements of bodily parts now begins to look
precarious, and its supremacy is hardly supported by Glisson's third and final
proposition. Here, Glisson unwittingly attributed to the nerves a mind oftheir own, as
it were, which enabled them to carry out "such a grosse command as that last before
mentioned". So, "the nerves serving for every motion, may be sufficiently excited"
while "other nerves, upon that excitation will not at all be stirred",
because those nerves onely, which are propper to the action required, have learned by custome &
long practice, that they are to move upon such a signal given, and the other nerves have in like
manner bene accustomed to sitt still upon the same signall ... wherefore, I conclude, that the
nerves learne to execute the dictates of the braine, upon the signall given, by custome and often
experience.15
Only a fewfoliosearlier, Glisson had described howmemory and learningwerespecial
attributes oftheperceptive faculty, that "immanent action" which "cannot reache any
thinge with out [its] owne subject".16 Smallwonder, then, that Glisson's lecture on the
brain and its three noble faculties breaks off abruptly at this point.
However, Glisson wasnot the only one to beconfused about these matters. Even his
mentor, the great William Harvey, hadexpressedcontradictory ideasabout theseatof
perception in his Degeneratione animalium (1651). One moment Harvey implied that
irritability depended on the mediation of the brain:
thatwhich isplainlydevoid ofall sensation does not seem to beable to beprovoked in anyway or
to be excited to move or initiate any actions. And we have no other sure sign by which we can
distinguish an animate and sentient creature from one that is dead and senseless except by its
movement which is provoked by some offensive object and which follows immediately upon the
experience ofthissensation and soprovestheexistenceofsensation. But it is reasonable todiscuss
this matter further when we treat of the actions and use of the brain.17
l3Ibid.
4 Ibid., f.165.
5Ibid., ff.165-6.
6Ibid., f.163.
7 William Harvey, Disputationstoucthing tlhegeneration olaninials, translated by Gweneth Whitteridge,
Oxford, Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1981, ch. 57, pp. 297 298.
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And yet, only a few paragraphs earlier, Harvey wrote about motions independent of
the brain and other sensory organs:
Those motions and actions which the physicians call natural because they go on whether we will
or no, and which we can neither moderate, accelerate, retard nor inhibit at our pleasure and are
therefore independent ofthe brain, yet they are not performed without any sensation at all ....
Forwhatsoever it is that by the diversity ofits own movements strives against these things which
provoke and molest it, must needs be endowed with sensation.18
Significantly, one ofHarvey'sexamples oforgansexhibiting innate sensitivity referred
to the stomach and guts:
The stomach and guts attacked by bad humours, often stir up nausea, and belching, rumbling,
vomiting and flux of the bowels, and it is not in our power to arrest these movements or to
instigate them, and so I do not know of any sense depending on the brain which should excite
those parts to actions of this kind.19
When Glisson decided to follow up his research into the anatomy and function ofthe
liver, hechoseashissubjectthestomachandguts. Itwasduringthecourseofthiswork
thathedeveloped hisconceptsofnaturalperceptions, appetites,andnaturalmotilityin
all the fibres ofthe body even where no nerves were present. In developing theseideas,
Glisson was able to draw not only upon various hints in Harvey, Galen, and Aristotle
but also, as Pagel has shown, upon certain ideas found in the works ofJoan Baptista
van Helmont. In particular, theconcept ofnerves "learning" fromexperience whether
to respond ornot to a "grosse command" ofthe brain, which seemed so anomalous in
his lecture on the brain tothe Royal College, gave place to ageneral claim that all fibre
in the body iscapable of"learning" and "knowing" by virtue ofits archeus or natural
perception.20
By his own account, Glisson had completed his work on the stomach and intestines
by 1662butheheld itback forfifteen years beforepublishingit. Thereason hegavefor
this leaves us in no doubt as to the importance he placed upon his Treatise on the
energetic nature ofsubstance for a full understanding ofhis anatomical work. His first
draft ofDe ventriculo "presupposed in many places (although also proving in many
places) a general Natural Perception" which had not been written about anywhere.
Consequently, "it seemed right", Glisson wrote, that the draft "should be postponed
until I could produce and bring into the light another Treatise, forerunner to this, on
the Life ofNature".21 According to a manuscript fragment, Glisson believed that the
delay would amount to no more than two years, but clearly he was over-optimistic.
"After the triall of a year or two I founde the worke so difficult", he said, "that it
seemed to involve the whole body of natural physiology."22 In the event, his
"I Ibid., pp. 296-297.
'9 Ibid., p. 297.
20 On the influence ofGalen and Harvey see Temkin, op. cit., note 6 above; on the influence ofAristotle,
see Pagel (1953), note 3 above; and on the influence of Harvey and Van Helmont see Pagel (1967), op. cit..
note 3 above especially pp. 500-501 and 505. 508-509.
21 Glisson (1677), op. cit, note 7 above, sig. A3r.
22 Thisfragment is adraft, in English, ofthededicatoryepistle to the Earl ofShaftesbury. British Library,
Sloane MS 574B, f.159v.
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Tractatus ... de vita naturae appeared in 1672, fiveyears beforethe final version ofDe
ventriculo. It is here that Glisson developed and expounded the notion that substance
ormatteritselfhas an "energetic nature" and a "life" which isprimarilyexemplified in
those three "noble faculties" he once reserved for the brain: the perceptive, appetitive,
and motive faculties.
Glisson clearly agreed with Harvey's sentiments expressed in De generatione, that
the only way to distinguish between "an animate and sentient creature" and "one that
isdead and senseless" was in terms ofperception and theability to move in accordance
with those perceptions.23 The point ofGlisson's De vita naturae, however, was simply
to show that there was no such thing as "dead and senseless" matter. All matter,
organic and inorganic alike, was endowed with life, Glisson insisted, and that life was
defined in terms of an intrinsic motility which could be activated by inherent
perceptivity and appetite (or aversion) within the matter itself. The difference, for
Glisson, between what was usually considered to be non-living and living matter was
simply one of organization. Provided matter was organized in a suitable way, the
natural perception of matter could be "reduplicated" so that it perceived its own
perception-giving rise to the sensitive nature ofanimals-and the vita naturae could
be "duplicated" or "triplicated" to produce what we recognize as vegetable or animal
life. The death ofa plant or animal occurs upon the dissolution ofthis double ortriple
alliance.24
Glisson'sviews on thenatureofplant and animal lifeled naturally in his Treatisetoa
categorical rejection ofthe concept ofa separate "substantial soul" in animals. This in
itself, however, was not a radical departure from contemporary medical thinking:
Cartesians too denied the existence of an animal soul, and Gassendists, like Walter
Charleton and Thomas Willis, regarded it as a subtle material principle which
dissipated on the death ofthe animal. Furthermore, Glisson was careful to point out
thatmanwasendowedwithanimmaterial rational soulwhich, beingpreternatural, fell
outside the purview ofhis natural philosophy.25 Nevertheless, in view ofthe vigorous
monistic approach to the concept of life expressed in De vita naturae, it is easy to
imagine that a contemporary reader might have been reminded ofthe opening words
ofThomas Browne's Religiomediciand thought them a suitable testament for Glisson
himself: "Formy Religion, though there beseverall circumstances thatmightpersuade
the world I have none at all, as the generall scandall of my profession, the naturall
course ofmy studies .... ,26 In fact, much more research is needed before we can begin
to assess the significance of the medical profession's reputation for irreligion and, in
particular, Glisson's own attitude to religion.27 Nevertheless, we can see from Henry
More's reaction to Glisson, examined below, that this leading theologian regarded
Glisson's monistic philosophy as dangerously atheistic in tendency. So far, we know
little of what Glisson's fellow physicians thought about De natura substantiae
23 Harvey, op. cit., note 17 above.
24 Glisson, op. cit., note 5 above, especially 'Ad lectorem', section I1, sig. b2v-b3r, and ch. 18. section 5,
pp. 234-5.
25 Ibid., 'Ad lectorem', sections 7 and 8, sig. a4v-blv.
26 Thomas Browne, Religiomedici, London, Andrew Crooke, 1643. p.1.
27 There are indications ofan interest in theology in Glisson's manuscripts: British Library, Sloane MS
3315, f.121-131 and Sloane MS 2251, f.l 17. A catalogue and index ofGlisson's papers is beingprepared by
Dr Jeffrey Boss and I am grateful to him for these references.
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energetica, but it is clear from More's attack upon him, and Richard Baxter's defence,
that its importance and relevance was recognized beyond the bounds of the medical
profession.
In conclusion, then, we can say that although the Treatise on the energetic nature of
substance is Glisson's only philosophical work, it cannot therefore be dismissed as a
merecuriosity. Itwasdeveloped asanessentialcomplementtohismedicalwritingsand
fitsperfectly naturally intothe restofhisoeuvre. Havingreliedheavily, in theAnatomia
hepatis, on a concept of irritability to account for the periodic expulsion of large
amounts ofbile from thegall-bladder into the intestine, Glisson subsequently believed
that thedependence ofirritability on thepresence ofnervescreated moreproblems than
it solved. His development ofhints from Aristotle, Galen, Van Helmont, and Harvey
and his own researches on the digestive system led him to formulate his concepts of
natural perception, natural appetition, and natural motion intrinsic to all body fibres.
And theseinturn ledhim toworkouttheimplications oftheseideas forgeneralmatter
theory. The end result, in the Treatise of 1672, is a complete system of natural
philosophy dealing not only with organic but also inorganic matter and arguing for a
materialistic vitalism which could be used to cut the Gordian knot of problems
associated with Cartesian dualism by showing that all matter was intrinsically alive
and endowed with faculties of perception, appetition, and self-motion.
HENRY MORE AND MEDICAL IDEAS ABOUT LIFE AND THE SOUL
Themajorintellectual endeavour ofMore'scareer was tocombat theatheism which
he perceived to be increasingly prevalent among his contemporaries (educated and
uneducated alike). His earliest publications, therefore, constitute what has recently
been called "an important philosophical programme" by which More hoped to prove
the existence ofGod and the immortality ofthe soul.28 In fact, it was the nature ofthe
immortal soulwhich occupiedmostofMore's attention (beginningwith his Platonicall
songofthesoul, 1642, andculminatingwithhisImmortality ofthesoulin 1659) because
arefusaltobelieveinanafter-life, withitsattendantnotionsofpunishmentsorreward,
was seen by More as likely to have the most drastic consequences on social behaviour.
The "practical atheist", the libertine scoffer who had no religious and (ipsofacto,
according to More) nomoralscruples, wasthegreatestthreattothesmoothrunningof
society because his behaviour was not constrained by the fear of post-mortem
punishments.
These sort ofpeople [More wrote] are very horribly afraid there should be any Spirit, lest there
should be a Devil, and an accountafter this life; and therefore they areimpatient ofanything that
implies it, that they may with a more full swing, and with all security from an after-reckoning,
indulge their own Lusts and Humours in this.
28 Gabbey, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 222.
29 The quotation is from 'Dr. H. M. his letter, with the postcript to Mr J. G... .' which More included in
his edition of Joseph Glanvill's Saducismus triumphatus or,,full andplain evidence concerning wtitches and
apparitions, London for J. Collins and S. Lownds, 1681, pp. 16-27, at p. 23. The Platonicallsong of thesoul
can be consulted in Alexander B. Grosart (editor), The complete poems ofDr. Henr, More (1614-1687),
[Edinburgh University Press] forprivatecirculation, 1878. The immortality ofthesoul, op. cit., note 4 above
is moreconveniently consulted in Henry More, A collection ofseveralphilosophical writings, London, James
Flesher for William Morden, 1662, which is now reprinted, New York and London, Garland. 1978.
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More elaborated his pneumatology, therefore, in an effort to provide the clearest and
most forceful arguments for a personal after-life.30
In his attempt to give a comprehensive and definitive account ofthe nature ofthe
soul, More realized that he could not confine himself merely to a discussion of
Christian doctrines. In view ofhis reputation as a leading member ofthe Cambridge
Platonists it is hardly surprising that he should also consider Platonist and
neo-Platonist arguments. However, his consideration of current medical theories
might seem, from ourpoint ofview, somewhat unexpected. But once we recognize the
background to seventeenth-century pneumatology it becomes clear that More simply
could not ignore medical theories. As D. P. Walker has shown, the eclectic
neo-Platonism of the Renaissance gave rise to a number of confusions or
contaminations between notions ofspiritus, pneuma, and anima. Medical theories of
"spirit" wereespeciallylikely tolead tosuchconfusions, Walkerhasargued, becauseit
was frequently invoked to bridge the metaphysical gap between body and soul, or
matter and mind.31 By the seventeenth century, there was a tradition, well established
in spite ofits potentially heretical nature, which tended to identify souls with medical
concepts ofspirit.32 This tradition could then be drawn upon by the early mechanical
philosphers to explain those aspects ofmental life which men share with animals. The
Cartesian res cogitans wasconcerned onlywith abstract reasoning; all other aspects of
human behaviour could be explained, analogously to animal behaviour, by the
motions ofanimal spirits through the nerves and into the muscles. As Henry More
summed it up:
the Glandula Pinealis is the common Sentient or Percipient ofall Objects; and without a Soul, by
virtue of the Spirits and Organization of the Body, may doe all those feats that we ordinarily
conceive to be performed by Soul and Body joined together. For it being one ... and so
handsomely seated as to communicate with the Spirits as well of the posterior as anteriour
Cavities ofthe Brain; by their help all the motions ofthe Nerves (as well those that transmit the
sense ofoutwards Objects, as of them that serve for the inward affections of the Body, such as
Hunger, Thirst and the like) are easily conveighed into it; and so being variously moved, it does
variously determine the course ofthe Spirits into such and such Muscles, whereby it moves the
Body.33
Hereinafter I shall refer to this as More, Immortality. For a further account of More's attitude to
post-mortem punishment see D. P. Walker, The decline ofhell: seventeenth-century discussions ofeternal
torment, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964, pp. 122-134. On the riseofconcern about atheism during
this period see G. E. Aylmer, 'Unbeliefin seventeenth-century England', in D. Pennington and K. Thomas
(editors), Puritans andrevolutionaries, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, pp. 22-46; John Redwood, Reason,
ridicule and religion: the age ofenlightenment in England, 1660-1750, London, Thames & Hudson, 1976;
Michael Hunter, Science andsociety in Restoration England, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 162-187;
idem, 'The problem of "atheism" in early modern England', Trans. R. Hist. Soc., 5th Series, 1985, 35:
135-157.
30 I havegiven a fulleraccountofMore'spneumatology and the reasons foritsextremeimportance in his
philosophical career in 'A Cambridge Platonist's materialism: Henry More and the concept of soul', J.
Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 1986, 49: 172-195.
31 Walker, 'Medical spirits in philosophy.. .', op. cit., note 3 above, pp. 287-289.
32 Ibid., p. 288; and idem, 'Medical spirits and God and the soul', op. cit., note 3 above.
33 More, Immortality, p. 80. For fuller discussions ofCartesian mechanist biology see L. C. Rosenfield,
Frombeast-machine toman-machine: the themeofanimalsoulin French lettersfrom Descartes to La Mettrie,
NewYork, Oxford University Press, 1940; P. R. Sloan, 'Descartes, thesceptics, and the rejection ofvitalism
in seventeeth-century physiology', Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., 1977, 8: 1-28; and Carter, op. cit., note I above.
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As Ihavearguedelsewhere, Walkerisperfectlycorrect tosuggest thattheseheretical
materialist concepts of soul contaminate even More's own concept of the soul.34
However, if we ignore these philosophical inconsistencies then it is true to say that
More is totally committed to a dualistic belief in the existence of incorporeal
substances. Essentially, these incorporeal substances fall under three headings. There
is God himself, ofcourse, and there are two different kinds of"created spirits". There
are, on the one hand, all the immaterial souls ofmen, angels, and demons; and on the
other hand, there is a ubiquitous "Spirit ofNature" pervading even deep within the
densest material body. Now, More ingeniously used the mechanical philosophy to
establish the existence of these immaterial substances. His early admiration for
Cartesian mechanism stemmed from his belief that Descartes had shown "the just
extent ofthe Mechanical Powers ofMatter, how farre they will reach, and where they
fall short." It was the short-fall that was important for More, since it enabled him to
bring in the Spirit of Nature which was held to be
A substance incorporeal, but without Sense and Animadversion, pervading the whole Matter of
theUniverse, andexercising aPlastical powerthereinaccording to thesundrypredispositions and
occasionsinthepartsitworksupon,raisingsuchPhaenomena in theWorld, bydirecting theparts
of the Matter and their Motion, as cannot be resolved into mere Mechanical powers.5
IfMore's enterprise in natural theology was to succeed, therefore, he had to defend
theimmateriality oftheSpirit ofNatureatallcosts. Ifheconceded anycorporeality in
his hylarchic principle, his whole philosophy was in danger of reduction to
materialistic mechanism and became indistinguishable from the atheistic philosophy
of"themostableAdvocate" ofmaterialism, Thomas Hobbes.36 The Spirit ofNature,
therefore, was used to explain various physical phenomena, such as the descent of
bodiesduetogravity,cohesion,condensation andrarefaction,magnetism, andvarious
otherphenomena which proved to be problematic for the mechanical philosophy. On
biological and psychological questions, however, More did not want to rely on a
universal spirit ofnature since itmight lead to another heresy: the denial ofindividual
souls in favour ofthe Averroistic notion of a universal soul.37 The Spirit of Nature,
then, gives place to individual souls in living creatures:
Godisnottheimmediate Makerofthese Bodies ... Nor, isitcongruous toadmit that the Plastick
faculty ofthe Soul ofthe World [i.e. the Spirit ofNature] is the soul contriver ofthese fabricks of
particular creatures (though I will not deny but she may give some rude preparative strokes
towards Efformation;) butthat ineveryparticular World, such as Man isespecially, his own Soul
is the peculiar and most perfective Architect thereof, as the Soul of the Worlds is of it.38
34 See note 30 above; and Walker, 'Medical spirits in philosophy', op. cit., note 3 above, p. 289, 294.
35 More, Immortality, 13 and 193.
36 Ibid., 43. On the contemporary reaction to Hobbes see S. 1. Mintz, The hunting of Leviathan:
seventeenth-century reactions to the materialism and moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbeos, Cambridge
University Press, 1970.
37 On Averroistic notions ofthe soul see P. 0. Kristeller, Renaissance thought anditssources, New York,
ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1979,pp. 181-196;andidem, 'Paduan Averroism and Alexandrism in thelightof
recentstudies', in Renaissance thoughtII: Papersonhumanismandthearts, NewYork, Harper& Row, 1965,
pp. 111-118.
38 More, Immortality, 102.
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In the Scholia added to his philosophical works for the Latin Opera omnia of 1679,
Moredelineated morecarefully the spheres ofinfluence ofthe Spirit ofNatureand the
soul. Subscribing to the Aristotelian beliefthat the soul is not infused into an embryo
untilitsfortieth day, heargued thatthe"preparativestrokes toward Efformation" ofa
foetus "are made by the Soul of the World, or by the Spirit of Nature", because
in Eggs, where the soul ofthe mother is not present, these first lineaments are formed before the
coming in of the Soul of the Chicken, as being not yet organiz'd; But particular Souls are,
according to Aristotle, the Actings ofan organical Body. But the Punctum saliens, or Life point,
discovers not any proper sense, but only Life when it withdraws itselffrom any hurtful touch: as
neither do what we call the Plant-Animals which I do not take to live by any proper Soul, but
through the Spirit of Nature, which hath either no Sense at all, or what is very dull.39
So, although the Spirit of Nature "assists in the very first beginnings of the
Generation of Animals" it is superseded, in the higher animals at least, by the
creature's individual soul.40 However, More's "main design" was not to distinguish
between the Spirit of Nature and the soul but rather "to demonstrate that there is a
Soul or Incorporeal Substance residing in us, distinct from the Body".41 Accordingly,
he was compelled to discuss critically various medical theories current at the time.
Forexample, in order to reserve forthe immaterial soul (or forthe immaterial Spirit
ofNature in lower animals) the architectonic or organizing power ofliving creatures,
More had to examine and reject a common alternative view. This was the remarkable
idea that "the Sun and the Stars are the most Intellectual Beings in the world, and in
them is that Knowledge, Counsel and Wisdome by which all Sublunary things are
framed and governed". According to this view, the sun and stars
by their several impresses and impregnations have filled the whole Earth with vital Motion,
raising innumerable sorts of Flowers, Herbs and Trees out of the ground. These have also
generated the several kinds ofliving Creatures. These have filled the Seas with Fishes, the Fields
with Beasts, andtheAirewith Fowles; theTerrestrial matter beingaseasily formedinto theliving
shapesofthese several Animals by thepowerful impress ofthe Imagination ofthe Sun and Stars,
as the Embryo in the womb is marked by the strong fancy of this Mother that bears him.42
Outlandish as this may seem to us, it was an extremely common notion in More's
day. Similar arguments can be found in the work of Jean Fernel, Marsilio Ficino,
Paracelsus, and even Robert Boyle. One of the ancient sources for this view is
Aristotle's Degeneratione animalium: "the spirit which is contained in the foamy body
ofthe semen . .. is analogous to the element of the stars", and it is duly considered,
39 This is taken from the English translation of the scholia which are included in the so-called "Fourth
edition" of A collection ofseveral philosophical writings, London, Joseph Downing, 1712, p. 105 (of the
Immortality, like the 1662 edition the treatises are separately paginated). This is called the fourth edition
because theoriginal separate works count as the first, the 1662 Collection as the second, and the Latin Opera
omnia (see note 54 below) as the third. On the time ofthe infusion ofthe soul into the embryo see John T.
Noonanjun, Contraception: ahistory o.fits treatmentby the Catholic Theologians andCanonists, Cambridge,
Mass., Belknap Press, 1965, pp. 89-90. The locus classicus is usually taken to be Aristotle, De hist. animal.,
VII, 3, 583b 2-5.
40 It seems that More did not confine the concept ofthe immortal soul exclusively to humankind. On the
immortality of animals see Immortality, 135-136.
41 Ibid., 88 [mis-numbered as 78].
42 Ibid., 52.
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therefore, by that latter-day Aristotelian biologist, William Harvey, in his own De
generatione.43 Nevertheless, More gave the idea short shrift. Donning his Cartesian
hat, he insisted that
thesunandStarshavenoimmaterial Being residingin them, butaremere Matterconsistingofthe
subtilest Particles and most vehemently agitated. For then we cannot but be assured that there is
nothing in them more Divine than what is seen in other things that shine in the dark, suppose
rotten wood, glo-worms or the flame of a rush candle.
And the idea that these heavenly bodies could form a creature like "the most curious
Automaton that ever was invented by the wit ofman" simply by "a mere Rectilinear
impress upon the Aether down to the Earth" was dismissed as untenable.44
More dealt similarly with other theories which suggested that the soul or the
organizingpowerofthebodywasmerelyaspecial kindofmaterial substance. Drawing
from the full range ofcurrent medical theories, he refuted in turn the suggestion that
actuation andguidance ofthebodytogetherwithperception and theotherfunctions of
the common sense could be performed by the body as a whole, the orifice of the
stomach, the heart, the brain, the septum lucidum, the pineal gland, "Regius his small
and perfectly-solid particle", the spinal marrow, and the animal spirits.45 We need not
consider each ofMore's arguments in any detail but it should be noted that the major
thrust ofhisdiscussion was todeny that matteritselfis sufficient to explain perception
and sentience. "This absurd Principle", as More called it, gave rise to the belief"that
Organization may doe strange feats":
asiftheyshouldimagine, thatthoughneitherSilver, norSteel, nor Iron, nor Lute-stringshaveany
Sense apart, yet being put together in such a manner and formed as will (suppose) make a
complete Watch, they may have Sense: that is to say, that a Watch may be a living creature,
though the several parts have neither Life nor Sense..46
More was so confident that he could explode this notion that he actually put it
forward as an axiom in order to show that Hobbes's "own acknowledged Principles
will necessarily inferre the Existence of [immaterial substances] in the World." The
twentieth axiom of The immortality ofthe soul reads:
43 Aristotle, Degen. animal., 736b-737a; William Harvey, Exercitationes degeneratione animalium, first
published London, 1651, ch. 46. On Fernel see Sir Charles Sherrington, The endeavour ofJean Fernel,
CambridgeUniversity Press, 1946; on Ficino seeWalker(1958) op. cit., note 3 above, especiallypp. 3-59; for
Paracelsus see Walter Pagel, Paracelsus: an introduction to philosophical medicine in the era of the
Renaissance, Basle, Karger, 1982,especially pp. 117-125. On Boyle see L. Thorndike, A historyofmagic and
experimentalscience, 8 vols., New York, Columbia University Press, 1923-1958, vol. 8, pp. 186-187. For a
general treatment of"lightmetaphysics", the tradition ofwhich these notions are a part, see A. C. Crombie,
Robert Grosseteste and the origins ofexperimental science, 1100-1700, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1953,
pp. 104-134; and David C. Lindberg, Theories ofvision.from Al-Kindi to Kepler, Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1976, 95-99.
44 More, Immortality, 53, 57.
45 Ibid., 77-94. As well as displaying a sound knowledge ofvarious traditional therories of anatomical
psychology, More also reveals here an awareness of recent theories propounded by J. B. van Helmont,
Henricus Regius, and Rene Descartes. More, like Descartes, seems to have regarded Regius in particular as
dangerouslymaterialistic inoutlook. See Nicolson(editor), op.cit., note 56below, p. 389; and Sloan, op. cit.,
note 33 above, pp. 23-28.
46 More, Immortality, 66, 77.
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Motion or Re-action of one part of the Matter against another, or at least a due continuance
thereof, is really one and the same with Sense and Perception, ifthere be any Sense or Perception
in Matter.47
Ofcourse, the conditional clause is crucial to More's case and it isjust that which he
then proceeded to deny. The absurdity of Axiom XX could be shown simply by
pointing out that wherever there is motion so must there be sense and perception. In
other words a dead carcass, a ringing bell, a bent bow, and "every Jack-in-a-box that
School-boyes play with" would have to be "living Animals or Sensitive Creatures".
Furthermore, on Hobbes's account, the communication ofthoughts from one person
to another can only take place by the justling of one interlocutor's animal spirits
againstthoseoftheother, "asifmenshouldknockheadstocommunicatetoeachother
their conceits of Wit."48
The essential point, then, of More's rejection of this mechanical account of
perception is that matter is totally passive:
It is sufficiently manifest from sense and experience that Matter is a principlepurely passive, and
nootherwisemoved ormodifiedthen assomeotherthing movesandmodifiesit, butcannot move
it selfat all. Which is most demonstrable to them thatcontend forSenseand Perception in it. For
ifit had any such Perception, it would by virtue ofits Self-motion withdraw it selffrom under the
knocks ofhammers or fury ofthe fire; or ofits own accord approach to such things as are most
agreeable to it and pleasing, and that without the help of Muscles, it being thus immediately
endowed with a Self-moving Power.
Matter, however, is "so stupid" that it lacks this Power ofself-movement, as Hobbes,
Descartes, or any strict mechanist would readily agree.49
Unfortunately for More, however, not everyone was a strict mechanist and
subscribed to this concept of completely passive matter. As More's close associate,
Ralph Cudworth, pointed outinhisencyclopaedic surveyofatheistphilosophies, there
were those who believed that matter was inherently active. The hylozoist, as Cudworth
dubbed such a thinker, considered that all matter could move itself without muscles
and that all matter could perceive and thereby could have a kind of sense without
sensory organs ornerves.50Cudworth was notslow to realize that hylozoism wasmuch
more dangerous to religion than the mechanical materialism (or "Atomick Atheism")
of a thinker like Hobbes,
47 Ibid., 5, 59.
48 Ibid., 66, 86.
49 Ibid., 60. I use the term "strict mechanist" to refer to anyone who believed that matter was totally
passive and inert. By no means all thinkers known to historians as mechanical philosophers were strict
mechanists. I have argued elsewhere that the possibility of active matter was widely entertained among
natural philosophers in seventeenth-century England: John Henry, 'Occult qualities and the experiemental
philosophy: active principles in pre-Newtonian matter theory' Hist. Sci., 1986, 24: 335-381.
50 Cudworth is not so careful to distinguish between perception and sensation as Glisson was. Sensation
only occurs in "animate" matter, that is to say matter which is sufficiently organized to enable the simple or
natural perception of matter to perceive its own perception. This perceptio perceptionis or reduplicated
perception constitutes sensation. It seems that highly organized, oranimate, matter is able todispose itselfin
such a way as to provide itself with special organs of sensation. This requires detailed exposition and
analysis, but for now see Glisson, op. cit.. note 5 above. pp. 208-216; Pagel (1953), op. cit.. note 3 above.
pp. 505-507.
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For whereas the Atomick Atheism supposes the Notion or Idea of Body to be nothing but
Extended Resisting Bulk, and consequently to include no manner of Life and Cogitation in it;
Hylozoism on the contrary makes all Body, as such, and therefore every smallest atom ofit, to
have Life Essentially belonging to it (Natural Perception and Appetite) though without any
Animal Sense or Reflexive Knowledge, as if Life, and Matter or Extended Bulk, were but two
Incomplete and Inadequate Conceptions, ofone and the same Substance, called Body. By reason
ofwhich life (not Animal but only Plastical) . .. it is plain that there is no Necessity at all left,
either of any Incorporeal Soul in Men to make them Rational, or of any Deity in the whole
Universe to solve the Regularity thereof.51
Although Cudworth attached no names to the title hylozoist (apart from the ancient
who allegedly founded the movement, Strato ofLampsacus), it is perfectly clear even
from this briefextract thatthe Regius Professor ofHebrewhad no oneelsein mind but
the ReguisProfessorofPhysicatCambridge, FrancisGlisson. ItwasonlyGlissonwho
argued in print for the natural perception and the natural appetite ofmatter and who
regarded life and matter as two conceptus inadequati of substance.52
So if in 1659 More could afford to dismiss the notion of sensitive and perceptive
matter as "A thing so foolish and frivolous, that the mere recital of the opinion may
well be thought confutation enough with the sober", after 1672 he was compelled to
treat the idea much more seriously. For it was in that year that Glisson's Tractatus de
natura substantiae energetica appeared.53
HENRY MORE AND FRANCIS GLISSON
Henry More returned to philosophical writing from more theological concerns
during the preparation ofhis collected works, in Latin translations, for the so-called
Operaomniaof1679.54 More took theopportunity ofthe newedition toadd scholia to
his earlier philosophical works but he also published a number ofshort pieces for the
first time.55 One ofthese new pieces, Ad. V.C. epistola altera, was concerned to refute
the thinker whom he considered to be the most dangerous atheist since Hobbes,
Benedict de Spinoza. We know from a letter ofMore's to Anne, Lady Conway, that
this little tract was composed hurriedly while the Latin collection of his works was
51 Ralph Cudworth, The true intellectual system ofthe universe: the.first part; wherein all the reason and
philosophyofatheism isconfuted; anditsimpossibilitydemonstrated, London, Richard Royston, 1678, p. 105.
52 The fact that Cudworth was attacking Glisson here has been noticed by Arrigo Pacchi, Cartesio in
Inghilterra da More a Boyle, Roma-Bari, Editori Laterza, 1973, pp. 150-155. Cudworth's concern with
hylozoism isdiscussed, but with no reference to Glisson, in John W. Yolton, Thinkingmatter: materialism in
eighteenth-century Britain, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984, pp. 4-13. See also Colie (1957), op. cit., note 4
above, pp. 117-144.
53 See note 5 above.
54 Henry More, Opera omnia, tum quae latine, tum quae anglice scripta sunt; nunc vero Latinitate
donata. . ., 2 vols., London, J. Macock and R. Norton for J. Martyn and Gualt. Kettilby, 1679. The short
title is often taken to include Opera theologica, anglice quidemprimitus scripta, nunc veroper autorem latine
reddita, London,J. Macock forJ. Martyn and Gualteri Kettilby, 1675, asthe firstvolumeofthree, but in my
references I exclude this and treat the Opera omnia as a two-volume work.
55 These include a number of pieces on cabbalism (De usu decem Sephirotharum, Catechismus
cabbalisticus, and Fundamentaphilosophiae sive cabbalae aeto-paedo-melissaeae ... .), a refutation ofJacob
Boehme's theology (Philosophiae teutonicae censura), and the attack on Spinoza (see following note) which
concerns us here. For a brief but important discussion of the Cabbalae aeto-paedo-melissaeae see C. A.
Staudenbaur, 'Platonism, theosophy and immaterialism: recent views ofthe Cambridge Platonists', J. Hist.
Ideas, 1974, 35: 157-169, which corrects the thoroughly unsound S. Hutin, Henri More, essai sur les
doctrines theosophiques che- les Platoniciens de Cambridge, Hildesheim, G. Olms, 1966.
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actually in press. The letter also reveals that he began writing his refutation of
Spinoza's Tractatus theologico-politicus even before he had finished reading the work.
This is what he said to Anne:
I comethuslateto London byreasonofCuperushisConfutation ofTractatus Theologicopoliticus
which Monsieur Van Helmont gave meat Ragley from a friend in Holland, inquires, whichwhile
it was a binding at Cambridge I fell a reading Theologicopoliticus the better to understand
Cuperus hisconfutation when itcamefrom binding. But I found thisTheologicopoliticus such an
impious work, that I could not forbeare confuting him while a [sic] read him ... Proposing this
Confutation of mine shall make up some part of this Philosophicall volumn.56
Spinozism, then, wasregarded asaphilosophicalemergencywhichhad to betreated
immediately. Theurgency ofMore's response stems in part fromthefactthat Spinoza,
unlike Hobbes and theCartesians, seemed to argue that matterisinherently activeand
"alive". This approach, More could hardly fail to recognize, completely undermined
his previous attempts to establish the existence ofincorporeal animating spirits, all of
which were based on the Hobbist or Cartesian assumption that matter is completely
passiveandinert. ItwasduringthecourseofhisresponsetoSpinozistic"living" matter
that More paused in order to reject Glisson's arguments for the "energetic nature of
substance". He took his cue from his fellow anti-Spinozist, Franciscus Cuperus:
So when Cuperus says that modern atheists nowadays believe in theinnate lifeofmatter, not in a
mechanical mover, he gives a nod to some such hypothesis as the most distinguished Doctor
Francis Glisson attempted to describe, with very accurate andclear arguments, in hisTreatise de
NaturaSubstantiae Energetica, or, de VitaNaturae. Whereas Spinozacontends thatsubstance, in
so far as it issubstance, exists ase, indeed is that which subsistsby itselfso he[Glisson] holds that
substance, quasubstance, lives by thenecessary powerofitsNature, that is, it perceives, it desires
anditmovesitself[percipere,appetere, sesequemovere]: whichfaculties;perceptive,appetitiveand
motive; he holds, accordingly, to be immediately present in matter itself.5
There follow eightcloselyargued folio pagesagainstGlisson's philosophy and what
More saw as its atheisticimplications. It isclearfrom these pages that Morehadgiven
closeattention to Glisson's Tractatus, andit iseasy to seewhy. Glissontook theconcept
ofinherently active matter further than any ofhis contemporaries, including Spinoza.
Since Glisson believed that the energetic nature of substance was the internal
principle ofmovements in matter he tried to take evidence for his case "from various
motions observed in Nature". Glisson understood the word "motion", in the
56 Henry More to Anne, Lady Conway, 3 April [1677], in Marjorie H. Nicolson, Conwaj letters: the
correspondenceofAnne, ViscountessConw%ay, Henri' More, andtheirfriends, 1642-1684, New Haven, Conn.,
Yale University Press, 1930, p. 429. Franciscus Cuperus [Frans Cuiper] (1629-92) published a refutation of
Spinoza under the title, Arcana atheismi revelata, philosophice et parado.xe refutata e.xamine Tractatus
Theologico-Politici, Rotterdam, IsaacNaeranus, 1676. Foradiscussionofthiswork anditsauthorseeColie,
op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 74-75, 97-116. More's "confutation" of Spinoza appeared in volume I of the
two-volume Opera omnia (see note 54 above), as Ad V.C. epistola altera quae brevem Tractatus
Theologico-politici confutationem complectitur, paucaque subfinem anne.xa habet de libri Francisci Cuperi
scopo, cui titulus est, Arcana Atheismi revelata, pp. 565-614. The identity of V.C. still engages scholarly
speculation: there is a footnote about it in Gabbey, op. cit., note 2 above. pp. 214-215; and see also Paolo
Cristofolini, Cartesiani e sociniani: studio su Henry More, Urbino, Argalia Editore, 1974, pp. 139-141.
Cristofolini also reprints the latin text of Ad V.C. epistola altera, pp. 139-206.
57 More, Opera omnia, 1: 601. Glisson is mentioned on p. 601 and examined in detail pp. 604-611.
Translations from this are mine.
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Aristotelian sense, to mean "change" and so a number ofhis examples ofmotion may
seem unfamiliar to us. Not only did he argue from the motion "of the Heavens and
Planets and even the Earth itselfaround the Sun", the motions caused by horror vacui
and "the motion of Rarefaction and Condensation" but also from "the motion of
solidity" [motus Antitypiae], "the motion of coherence" [motus nexus], and "the
motion of freedom" [motus libertatis] (by which he meant the elastic tendency of a
compressed body, say, to return to its former state when external pressure is
removed).58 Henry More attempted to refute each of these in turn. The resistance or
solidity ofmatter cannot be used to prove the vitality of matter, he insisted, because
"substance qua substance" is sufficient to explain solidity. By which, presumably, he
meant that solidity is part ofthe definition ofmatter.59 Elsewhere he called upon the
mechanical philosophy in an effort to show that Glisson's vitalism was an unnecessary
hypothesis. Thecoherence ofmattercan beexplained more simply (so More believed!)
in terms ofCartesian circular motion, the plenum, and the non-interpenetrability of
matter. Similarly, "the Motus Coelorum, that is, the Vortexes, does not indicate any
perceptive life in thematter ofthe vortexes, since such a portion ofmotion is impressed
on them mechanically, or much more likely by some immaterial principle, that they
revolve freely in these gyrations entirely without self-perception."60 Needless to say,
the immaterial principle alluded to here is More's "Spirit ofNature", and he invoked
that in his rejection ofall Glisson's other examples ofdifferent kinds ofmotion. "The
parts ofmatter", for example, "cohere and are connected by the one universal bond of
the Spirit ofNature which holds together and actuates the whole material world." It is
the hylarchic principle, then, which accounts forfuga vacui and for motus libertatis.
When air is caused to expand by heating, for example, it is merely due to increased
vibration ofthe particles and, on cooling, the air returns to its former volume "not by
its own power but by virtue of the Universal Hylostatic Spirit."61
58I am paraphrasing, and quoting from More's account ofGlisson's theories. See More, Opera omnia, 1:
605-606. In fact, More was simplifying Glisson's account. Glisson distinguished between perpetual and
non-perpetual motions. The perpetual motions are motus antitypia, motus nexus and motus corporum
coelestiwn and they are discussed in the Tractatus, note 5 above, pp. 352, 354 and 355 respectively.
Non-perpetual motions are more complicated and less clear. At ch. 25 (pp. 356-363) we learn that there are
three kinds of non-perpetual motion depending on whether the motive principle is internal, external, or a
mixture ofboth. In order to establish his claims about the innate motility ofall matter, Glisson discounted
the first ofthese (which is not incontention) and turned his attention tothe last two kindswhich hecalled, in
keeping with the common opinion, "inanimate". Inanimate motions are divided into five classes which
embrace theother examples of"Species" ofmotion which More singled out. Motus libertatus isdiscussed at
p. 375, motus condensatione et rarefactione at p. 376, fuga vacui at p. 367, but see also p. 432.
59 More, opera omnia, 1: 605.
60Ibid.
61 Ibid., p. 606. More used similararguments, employing the Spirit ofNature to account forphenomena
which could be explained perfectly adequately without it, in his Enchiridion metaphysicum: sive de rebus
incorporeissuccinta &luculentadissertatio. Parsprima:deexistentia&naturarerumincorporearum ingenere,
London, E. Flesher, 1671. Consequently, he had already attracted the attention of the two leading
experimentalphilosophersin England, Robert Boyleand Robert Hooke, both ofwhom repudiated hisideas
in print. See Robert Boyle, An hydrostatical discourse occasion'd by some objections of Dr. Henry More
against some explications ofnew experiments. . ., London, for Richard Davis, 1672; and Robert Hooke,
Lampas: or, descriptions ofsome mechanical improvements of lamps and waterpoises..., London, John
Martyn, 1677, reprinted in R.T. Gunther(editor), EarlyscienceinOx.ford, 15vols.,Oxford, [fortheauthor],
1923-1967, vol. 8 (1931), pp. 182-195. In spite of this and another polemic on the same issue with the
scientificvirtuoso,SirMatthewHale, Moreremainedrecalcitrant. I haveexamined More'srelationshipwith
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More's "confutation" of Glisson's internal principles of motion, philosophically
unsatisfactory though it is, stands representative of all his arguments. He never met
Glisson on his own terms butwasmerelycontent to assert thateverything Glisson used
to support his case actually supported the existence ofthe Spirit ofNature. Glisson's
arguments, More somewhat petulantly insisted, "do not prove that lifeemanates from
matter itself or that life is not communicated to it by an immaterial Principle". The
point is, of course, that More was driven by his theological concerns to beg the very
questions that really divided him from Glisson. At one highly significant point in his
discussion More let the reason for his anxiety show: "This argument [that internal
motion isa sufficient principle oflife] cannot prove that matter is autozoon [self-living]
and endowed with perceptive and appetitive life, unless it is previously supposed that
there is no God who can create a Spirit purely Plastic and set it over the matter of the
world."62
According to More, then, this vitalist way ofarguing was even more dangerous than
Hobbist mechanism. Glisson actually seemed (by implication) to take providence out
of God's hands and to implant that too directly within matter when he asked "Is
Nature so far fortuitous that it begins a new operation ofits own record without any
purpose to itself'? or does it rather manage all things wisely and not without admirable
providence?"63 It was speculations like these which led More to denounce Glisson's
philosophy in the strongest terms: "Only those who deny God and all incorporeal
substance; strive to seek the origin ofmotion and all life which gleams in the universe in
matter itself."64
More clearly announced that Glisson's philosophy "should certainly carry some
weight with those who deny any substance beyond body. For, then it may be
reasonable enough to decide that a kind oflife is immediately and primaevally present
in matter, whose characteristic properties of life; which are thought to be, and are
called 'souls' by the vulgar; are only various modifications of matter......65
More agreed, therefore, with Franciscus Cuperus that "modern atheists ... having
forsaken mechanical reasons for the created world, take up [a belief] in the primitive
life of matter."66
these and other natural philosphers in a forthcoming paper entitled 'Henry More*'. Robert Boyle: the Spirit
of Nature and the nature of Providence'.
62 More, Opera omnia, 1: 607.
63 Ibid. This is a quotation from Glisson's ch. 17, sect. 3 (as More tells us). It is to be found in Glisson. op.
cit., note 5 above, p. 226. The point of Glisson's rhetorical questions was to affirm that matter must have
perception and appetite: "I am unable to conceive how it happens that motion arises purely from an internal
principle, yet that principle neither desires nor perceives."
64 More, Opera omnia, 1: 607.
65 Ibid., p. 608.
66 Ibid. See also p. 611 where More concluded that the "modern atheists", of whom Cuperus speaks,
"who profess a vital principal in the created World, but because oflife arising from matter itself, and who do
not believe that there is anything in nature beyond this living matter, can scrape together for themselves
nothing from the writings ofGlisson by which they very greatly support their cause." I should point out that
the charge of atheism was an extremely serious one at the time and, consequently, More pointed out that
Glisson "not only acknowledges but so often insists upon the existence of the Creator God and other
incorporeal substances", p. 607. As we shall see, it is perfectly possible to propound a natural philosophy like
that of Glisson and still remain within the traditions of voluntarist theology.
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It seems likely, then, that it was More's obsessive fear ofatheism which inhibited his
philosophical analysis of Glisson's Tractatus and prevented him from providing any
really cogent counter-arguments. More's response is best characterized as merely a
series of desperate reiterations of the role of the Spirit of Nature in the fabric of the
World. Consider this final example:
it is thoroughly manifest that the most learned Glisson has put forward no argument of any
import, neither a priori nor a posteriori, which might prove the Energetic Nature of
Substance ... since those patterns oflife which seem to appear in matter could be brought about
by some immaterial Principle.67
What is worse, More compounded this kind of unsatisfactory procedure with an
exercise in question-begging of astonishing impudence. The principle which More
invoked (against Glisson) to account for movements, perception, and other "patterns
oflife" must certainly be immaterial, More brazenly insisted, "because it dictates each
of the motions of Matter".68
IN DEFENCE OF GLISSON: RICHARD BAXTER'S POLEMIC WITH MORE
We would bemaking a serious mistake ifwe assumed that More's attack on Glisson
as a comforter ofatheists represented any kind ofconsensus. Writing at a time when
there was little consensus among theologians in general, More was regarded by a
number ofhis contemporaries as precariously idiosyncratic.69 But what is significant
67 More, Opera omnia, 1: 608.
68 Ibid. More's failure to confront Glisson's arguments and his monotonous reminders oftheexistence of
a "Spirit ofNature", which he claimed to haveproved in hisearlierwritings,clearly testify to the intense fear
of atheism that gripped him. But I think the marked intensity of More's commitment to the dualist
distinction between matter and a preternatural actuatingprinciple also illustrates an important insight to be
found in R. S. Westfall, Science and religion in seventeenth-century England, New Haven, Conn., Yale
University Press, 1958. Westfall, speakingofseventeenth-century natural theologians, said that "Despite the
natural piety of the virtuoso, the scepticism of the Enlightenment was already present in embryo among
them" (p. 219). The origins of their doubts, Westfall suggested, lay in the many objections to traditional
religion, "which were too close to their own beliefs to be ignored" (p. 145). In developing their natural
theologies, therefore, "More than answering hypothetical atheists, they were trying to satsfy their own
doubts" (p. 145). More was not a man who suffered from doubts but he was all too aware of how close
Glisson's ideas were to his own. Indeed, at one point, More said ofGlisson: "Ifhe had put for 'Nature' the
'Spirit of Nature' that would have been enough for us to agree" (Opera omnia, 1: 606). The closeness of
Glisson's ideas to those of More and Cudworth have also been noticed by Owsei Temkin (see his article in
DSB, 5:426-427). And yet, no matter how close they seem, the difference between them isabsolutelycrucial.
Perhaps More felt that byexpounding Glisson's arguments in order to refute them hewould stimulate more
interest in them. Hecertainly felt that hehad made this kindoferror before. As he wrote to Robert Boyleon 4
December 1671, "I have, from my very first letters to Descartes, till this last book ofmine, alwaysexpressed
my opinion, that this mechanical way would not hold in all phenomena, as I always verily thought: but this
would not save us from being accounted amongst the wits, one of their gang, and a perfect
Cartesian.... and, indeed, no less than an infidel and an atheist", in Robert Boyle, The wvorks, 6 vols.,
London, J. & F. Rivington, L. Davis, et al., 1772, vol. 6, p. 513. In Glisson's case, then, More chose not so
much to refute it as to pronounce it to be wrong. For a further discussion ofsimilarity between More's and
Glisson's ideas see Henry op. cit., note 30 above.
69 The fullest discussion of More's unorthodoxy is to be found in Samuel Parker, A free and impartial
censure ofthe Platonickphilosophie, Oxford, W. Hall for Richard Davis, 1666, especially pp. 79-83. Boyle,
op. cit., note61 above, referred to More's Principium HYlarchicum as a "precarious Principle" intheology as
well as natural philosophy, as did Sir Matthew Hale, Observations touching the principles of natural
motions; ... together wvith a reply to certain remarks touching tle gravitation of f1uidv, London, W. Godbid
for W. Shrowsbury, 1677, p. 282. Moreover, More felt the need to defend his ideas not by recourse to
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forourdiscussion isthe fact thatjust two yearsaftertheappearanceofMore's Ad. V.C.
epistola altera Glisson's name appeared once again in a theological context; but this
time he was cited with approbation. Richard Baxter, in his Methodus theologiae
christianae (1681), deferred twice to Glisson. Once, in the preface, on the subject ofthe
active principle in nature, and once on the subject of "Virtus activa vitalis".70 The
precise meanings ofthese references are (at least to this reader) somewhat obscure but,
fortunately, Baxterexpanded hisviews on active principles and on Glisson's Denatura
substantiae energetica in a letterto Henry Morewritten in the sameyear. It waswritten
at More's request because "It seemed good to the worthy Dr. to desire my thoughts of
his Description ofa Spirit, which he laid down in the first Edition ofMr. Glanvile of
Apparitions".71 The fact that More published a long reply to this private letter (in the
second edition of Glanvill's History ofapparitions) is powerful testimony to More's
sensitivity to criticism on this issue and of his protectiveness towards his concept of
spirit. This reply, entitled A letter to a learnedpsychopyrist, appeared early in 1682;
whereupon, within months, Baxter published his original letter, together with a
defence ofitinadiscourse Ofthenatureofspirits. However, thelastword on thematter
went to More (again a sign of the importance More attached to his own style of
pneumatology), this time writing as the anonymous commentator on Bishop Rust's
Discourse oftruth.72 This polemic, so farcompletely overlooked, contains a good deal
of interest for the intellectual historian but, for the sake of brevity, we will confine
ourselves here to those parts of the dialogue which involve Glisson.73
philosophical argument but by Scriptural exegesis in his Theapologyg ofDr. HenrY More, London, J. Flesher
for W. Morden, 1664. See also, M. H. Nicolson, 'Christ's College and the latitude-men', Mod Pliilologi',
1929, 27: 35-53.
70 Richard Baxter, Methodus theologiae christianae . . ., London, M. White and T. Snowden, 1681, sig.
A5r., p. 177.
71 Richard Baxter, Qfthe immortalit o.fmanssoule, andthenature ofit, andotherspirits. Twtodiscourses:
one inaletter toanunknowndoubter; theotherinareplyto Dr. HenrY More'sanimadversionsonaprivateletter
tohim; whichhepublishedinhissecondeditionofMr.Joseph. Glanvil'sSaddu(cismus Triunmphatus, orhistorv of
apparitions, London, for B. Simmons, 1682, Sig. a4r. See note 29above for full citation ofthe first edition of
Glanvill's Saducismus; the second edition, which includes More's 'Letter to a learned psychopyrist',
appeared in the first months of 1682 (new style). More's first letter to Baxter soliciting his opinion on the
concept ofspirit isextant in the Baxter MSS at DrWilliams's Library, Baxter Letters, 111, f.286(it isdated 25
September 1681).
72 Joseph Glanvill [and George Rust], Twochoiceanduseful treatises: theone Lux Orientalis oranenquiri'
into the opinion ofthe eastern sages concerning the praeexistence ofsouls. Being a keY to unlock the grand
mysteriesofprovidence, inrelation tomanssinsandmisery. Theotheradiscourseoftruth., hX thelate Rei'erend
Dr Rust Lord Bishop ofDromore in Ireland. With annotations on them both, London, for James Collins and
Sam Lowndes, 1682. More's annotations on Rust have a separate title page which reads: Annotations upon
the discourse oftruth into H'hich is insertedby way ofdigression, abriefreturn to Mr. Baxter:sreply, it'hich he
calls aplacid collation wvith the learned Dr. Henry More, occasioned by the Doctors ansiw-er to a letter of the
learnedpsychopyrist.... The digression is found pp. 180-246. Hereinafter cited as More, Digression. The
annotations areunsigned but they arealmostcertainly by More. See Nicolson, op. cit., note 56above, p. 173:
and Walker, op. cit., note 29 above, 126, 131.
73 Theonlyotherdiscussion ofthis polemicwhich I am awareofconsidersit in the broadercontext oflate
seventeenth-century discussionsofthe nature ofspirit: RobertCrocker, 'An intellectual biography ofHenry
More, 1614-1687', ch. 8 ofa thesis to be presented at Oxford University for the DPhil. I am grateful to Mr
Crocker for allowing me to read this prior to submission. One ofthe few historians to embark on a serious
studyofRichard Baxterin recent years is William M. Lamont buteven hefailed to notice thispolemic. More
subsequently accused Baxter of writing against his views on the Apocalypse as revenge against More's
"booke ofspirits". Lamont points this out but he seemsentirely unawareoftheirearlierpolemic. See W. M.
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The reason for More's initial concern to refute Baxter's private letter on the nature
ofspirits is made clear in a letter to Baxter ofFebruary 1682. A "psychopyrist", More
explained to Baxter, is a thinker who "would make all created Spirits a kinde offire"
and this popular opinion is the only serious threat remaining to "the most true and
useful notion ofa Spirit", namely More's own. There can be no doubt ofthe extreme
importance he attached to the issue:
That the world should have a true, easy and useful notion ofa Spirit I look upon it to be a thing of
exceeding great consequence which made me take this opportunity of settling it by this
confutation of the Psychopyrists in my Answer to your letter as I did by the confutation of the
Holenmerians and Nullibists in my short Treatise of the True Notion of a Spirit.74
Turning to Baxter's letter we can readily agree with More that this author had "closely
and compactedly ... couched therein the ... strengths of what they have to say for
themselves that are Psychopyrists."75 For example, Baxter wrote that
Though I run not into the excess of Ludov. Le Grand de Igne (nor of Telesius or Patricius)76 I
would Ignis were better studied: But this Room will not serve me to say what I think of it. But in
brief, He that knoweth that Ignis is a Substance, whose Form is the Potentia activa movendi
illuminandi, calefaciendi, these as received in a gross Passive Body, being but their Accidents oft,
but the Igneous Substance in act operating on them, and conceiveth of Spirits, but as Ignis
eminenter, that is, ofa purer substance; than Ignis is, which we best conceive of (next the Formal
Virtue) by its similitude, I think knows as much as I can reach ofthe Substance ofCreated Spirits.
And the Greek Fathers that called Spirits Fire, and distinguished Ignem per.formas into
Intellective, Sensitive and Vegetative or Visible Fire, (as it is in Aere Ignito) allowing an
Incomprehensible Purity ofSubstance in the higher above the lower (as in Passives Air hath above
Water, &c.). I think did speak tolerably, and as informingly as are the notions ofPenetrability and
Indivisibility; though perhaps these also may be useful.
Lamont, Richard Baxter and the millennium: Protestant imperialism and the English Revolution, London,
Croom Helm, 1979, p. 45. For a further indication ofthe extent ofMore's annoyance about Baxter's critique
of his notion of spirits consider the following: "I shall only name one DisingenuitY more, which was
antecedent to them all, and gave occasion both to Mr. Baxters Letter, and to the Doctors Answer thereto,
and to this Reply of Mr. Baxter. And that was, That Mr. Baxter in his Methodus Theologiae (as he has done
also in a little Pamphlet touching Judge Hales) without giving any reasons, which is the worst way of
traducing any man or his sentiments, slighted and slurred those two essential Attributes of a Spirit,
Penetrability and Indiscerpibility, which for their certain Truth and usefulness the Doctor thought fit to
communicate to the World", More Digression, p. 202. Baxter's comments on the nature of spirit in his
'Pamphlet touching Judge Hales' (see note 95 below) may be consulted in Sir Matthew Hale, Tlhe iworks.
moral and religious. .., London, H. D. Symonds et al., 1805, pp. 95- 100. Here also Glisson's theories are
invoked (p. 99).
74 More to Baxter, February 10 1681/2, Dr Williams's Library, Baxter Letters, vol. 111, f. 284. 1 am
grateful to the Trustees of Dr Williams's Library for allowing me to consult and quote from the Baxter
Letters. More was referring in this letter to his The easie, true, andgenuine notion andconsistent explication of
thenatureofaspirit..., which is an English translation ofthe last two chapters (27 and 28) ofthe Enchjiridion
metaphysicum (note 61 above), and which was included in Glanvill, op. cit., note 29 above. "Holenmerians"
are those who believe that the soul can betota in toto et tota in qualihetparte while "nullibists" are those, like
Descartes, who believe that souls are non-spatial entities and so, in More's terms, "nowhere".
75 Dr Williams's Library, Baxter Letters, vol. III, f. 284.
76 1 have been unable to trace Lodov. Le Grand and his book De igne. For brief accounts ofTelesio and
Patrizi see P. 0. Kristeller, Eight philosophers of the Italian Renaissance, Stanford University Press, 1964.
77 Baxter, Qf the nature of spirits, op. cit., note 71 above [the second of the Two discourses, separately
paginated]. sig. A5r/v. In his Letter to a learnedpsli-hopjrist, op. cit., note 71 above, More indicates that he
does not know which Greek Fathers Baxter had in mind, p. 234. Neither do 1, but for indications of the
background to similar ideas see, for example. the articles by Walker cited in note 3 above; and Everett
Mendelsohn, Heat andlite. the e(lvelopnment of the theori' ol animal heat, Cambridge. Mass.. Harvard
University Press, 1964.
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So, Baxter regarded fire as "a Substance permeant and existent in all mixt Bodies on
Earth ... in your Blood itis the primepart ofthatcalled the Spirits, which are nothing
but the Igneous Principle in a pure aerial Vehicle and is the Organ of the Sensitive
Faculties ofthe Soul".78 Clearly, Baxterwould agree with Richard Lower (to take one
example from many like-minded physiologists) that "the blood in its course through
the arteries is like a flaming fire." Once again we can see the profound influence of
medical ideas about spirits and the nature of the soul on a leading theologian.79
Among such general indications of a familiarity with current medical thinking in
Baxter's discourse on the soul we also find numerous specific references to Glisson. In
view of the frequency of these references and Baxter's failure to name any other
medical writer (unless we count a passing reference to Daniel Sennert on page 18), it is
safeto assumethatGlisson was the singlemost important source for Baxter's views on
medical spirits.80 Indeed, Glisson's opinions are drawn upon right at the beginning of
the first letter to More:
I think you and I areagreed that we cannotconceive ofa Spirit unico conceptu. but must have two
inadequate conceptions of it: of which one is that which Dr. Glisson De Vita Naturae calls
conceptus.fundamentalis, and is that which we call Substantia ... the other inadequate conceptus
is Formal; and I think you and I are agreed that this is Virtus Una-tria, as described by me, viz.
Virtus vitalis, vitaliter activa, perceptiva, appetitiva, as Dr. Glisson speaks.81
More's response to this was to argue that from these two inadequate conceptions of
spirit "one adequateConceptus does result" but, thankfully, we do not have to pursue
the philosophical niceties ofthis typical piece ofseventeenth-century theology. Suffice
it to say that More immediately recognized the danger implicit in Baxter's Glissonian
approach, "[which] is not only a mistake but a mischief, it implying that the Virtus
Appetitiva and Perceptiva, may be in a substance though Material which betrays much
ofthe succours that Philosophy affords to Religion in the points ofthe Existence ofa
God and Immortality of the Soul."82 The safe way to salvation, More insisted, was
through his own recension ofCartesian mechanism. This was a new philosphy which
still fulfilled the age-old role ofhand-maiden to religion: "This mode ofphilosophy is
the most useful for the best ends, and serves to support the main parts of natural
Religion the best; namely the Existence of God, of Genii or Angels, and the
78Baxter,
Of the nature ofspirit. op. cit.. note 71 above,
p. 71.
79 Richard Lower, Diatrihae Thomae Willi.sii ... de fihribus vindicatio..... London, J. Martyn and J.
Allestry, 1665, p. 117; see also pp. 23, 89-107, 110, 114-127. This has been reprinted with a translation as:
Kenneth Dewhurst (editor), Richard Lowiers Vindicatio: a d,.fince q ofthe experinmental mnethod. Oxford,
Sandford Publications, 1983. There would seem to be a lot in common between Willis's pyretology and
Baxter's "psychopyrism". For similar ideas see Mendelsohn, op. cit., note 77 above; R. G. Frank, Har,e
and the O.4ford phjsiologists: a study of scientific ideas and social interaction, Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1980; Douglas McKie, 'Fire and the .famnna vita/is: Boyle, Hooke and Mayow', in
Underwood (editor), op. cit., note 3 above, vol. 1, pp. 469-488; Mani, op. cit., note 6 above; A. G. Debus,
'Chemistry and the quest for a material spirit of life in the seventeenth century', in Fattori and Bianchi
(editors), op. cit., note 3 above, pp. 245-263.
80 There is evidence to suggest that Baxter and Glisson were acquainted. See below, notes 95 and 96.
81 Baxter, Qfthe nature of spirits, op. cit., note 71 above, sig. A2r/v. For "inadequate conceptions" see
Glisson, op. cit., note 5 above, sig. a2r/v, and pp. I1 1-2.
82 More, Letter, op. cit., note 71 above, p. 196, 198; cf. also p. 217.
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Immortality ofthe Soul." To deny this, he continued "deprives us ofsome ofthe most
considerable aids that Philosophy affords against Atheism and Epicurism."83
For his part, Baxter was just as sensitive as More to anything that might threaten
sound religion. He had, therefore, added a qualification to his citation of Glisson:
"And yet I dare not say that a self-moving principle is proper to a Spirit. Nor do I
consent to Campanella de sensu rerum, and Dr. Glisson that would make all things
alive by an essentiating form in the very Elements."84 The point of Baxter's
qualification, as he later spelled out, was that it is wrong to propose activity or life in
matter as a necessary or natural attribute but that there is no logical contradiction in
the concept of living, perceiving matter. As he himself put it;
I confess I am too dull to be sure that God cannot endue matter itself with the formal virtue of
Perception: That you say the Cartesians hold the contrary, and that your writings prove it,
certifieth me not. .. That Almighty God cannot make perceptive living Matter, and that by
informing it without Mixture [i.e. without adding a separate active substance to it], I cannot
prove, or I think you: Where is the Contradiction that makes it impossible?85
It is perhaps indicative of Baxter's philosophical sophistication that this same point
was made nearly ten years later by John Locke in his Essay concerning human
understanding.86 Also worthy ofLocke is Baxter's denial ofthe essentialdichotomy of
body and spirit on the grounds that all we can know are the modifications of
substances, not the substances themselves, because we learn everything through
sensation or perception.
For to tell you the truth [Baxter writes], I know nothing at all without the mediation of sense
except the immediate sensation itself, and the actsofIntellection, Volition or Nolition, & what the
Intellect infereth ofthe like, by the perception ofthcse ... Now hence I infer, that I have no sense
atall ofthedifference ofa Spirits Substantiality in such modes and accidents from that ofMatter,
and therefore how can I know it?87
The crucial difference between More and Baxter should now be abundantly clear.
More,inspiteofhismanydisagreementswith Descartes, wasalways totallycommitted
to the dualist distinction between body and soul (or spirit). Baxter, on the other hand,
seems to have had a much clearer sense of the philosophical shortcomings of any
dualist system.88 By insisting so vigorously on thecategorical difference between body
83 Ibid., p. 225.
84 Baxter, Ofthe natureof spirits, op. cit., note 71 above, sig. A3r.
85 Ibid., pp. 28-29. Baxter is referring to More, Letter, op. cit., note 71 above, p. 198.
86John Locke, An essav concerning humane understanding, London, Eliz. Holt for Thomas Basset, 1690.
bk. 4, ch. 3, sect. 6. For a full discussion of this aspect ofLocke's philosophy see Yolton, op. cit., note 52
above, especially pp. 14--28.
87 Baxter, Ofthe nature of.spirits, note 71 above, p. 15.
88 1 am unawareofanyextended historical analysis ofthe fortunes ofdualist and monist philosophies but
there is a good brief account of the reaction to Cartesian dualism in R. A. Watson, Tlhe downflil of
Cartesianism 1673-1712: a study ofepistemnological issues in late seventeenth-centurt( Cartesianism, The
Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, especially pp. 105-121, 147. There is much that is germane to the
background of seventeenth-century monism in Norman T. Burns, C(hristian mortalism fronm Trnd(ale to
Milton, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1972. Fortheend ofthecentury and the story through
the eighteenth, see Yolton, op. cit., note 52 above. There was frequent affiliation between monism and
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and soul, More found it impossible to give any plausible account of their interaction.
Wheneverheabandoned rhetoric and seriously tackled theproblem, hehad to resort to
a concept ofspirit which was every bit as materialistic as Baxter's "psychopyrism" (as
Baxter himselfwas quick to point out).89 Baxter, steeped in voluntarist theology, was
content totake amonistic solution to the soul-body problem because he believed God,
by hiswill, could endow matter with the attributes oflife, perception, and automotion.
However, the seventeenth-century reader was always quick to equate monism with
atheism (as reactions to Hobbes and Spinoza clearly indicate) and so Baxter's Ofthe
nature ofspirits is sprinkled with apologetic non-dogmatic expressions ofhis views.90
Nevertheless, itremainsclear that Baxterisin the tradition ofneo-Platonic writers who
characterized the system of the World in terms of a hierarchy of forms, descending
from the "purely immaterial" (God) through successively less-tenuous material
entitieslikelight,aether, fire, and airdownto thecrass material ofearthy substances.91
In this tradition, fire, being one ofthe most tenuous and subtle ofmaterial substances,
is frequently regarded as holding an intermediate position between the sub-lunary
world and the higher realm of"pure spirits". By the same token, fire can be equated
with the human soul which also holds this intermediary position.92 It is this
neo-Platonic tradition which provides the context for Baxter's rejection of the
mechanistic account of fire to which More subscribes. Baxter does not mince his
words:
medical theories. On this see the works by Walker and Pagel cited in note 3 above, and Walter Pagel, Tlhe
similing spleen: Paracelsianism in storm and stress, Basle, Karger, 1984, pp. 105-108, 148, 156.
89 On this seeWalker, 'Medical spirits in philosophy', op. cit., note 3 above, pp. 289, 293-296; and Henry,
op. cit., note30above. Seealso Baxter, Qfthenature ofspirits, op. cit., note 71 above, sig. A6v, pp. 47-49,64,
66, 91, and 95-97.
90 For example, Baxter admitted that when he tried to define the differences between substance and
matterhewas "'at aloss" (sig. A3v), that Glisson's way wasmerely "asprobable" as More's (p. 6) but that he
himselfpreferred to take "the middle way" (p. 7), and still remained content "with an ignoramus" on other
issues(p.21). Furtherevidenceforthecontemporary reluctance toadopta monist philosophy isprovided by
Baxter's statement that he was not an easy convert to the notion of a "Virtue una-trina, vitali, perceptiva,
appetitiva" in substance: "Nor did I easily assent to it; nor did Dr. Glisson after 80 years of age, easily
procure men to assent to it" (p. 25). As far as I know, Baxter's voluntarist theology has not been noticed
before, but for indications ofthevigour ofthis kind oftheology in seventeenth-century England, see Francis
Oakley, 'Christian theology and the Newtonian science: the riseoftheconcept ofthelawsofnature', Church
History, 1961, 30:433-457; J. E. McGuire, 'Boyle's conception ofnature', J. Hist. Ideas, 1972, 33: 523-542;
and Eugene M. Klaaren, Religious origins ofmodern science: beliefin Creation inseventeeth-CenturY thought,
Grand Rapids, Mich., W. B. Eerdmans, 1977, pp. 29-52.
91 On this see Crombie and Lindberg, both cited in note 43 above; as well as A. H. Armstrong, The
architecture of the intelligible universe in the philosophy of Plotinus: an analytical and historical studi,
Cambridge University Press, 1940; Kurt Goldammer, 'Lichtsymbolik in philosophischer Weltanschauung,
Mystik und Theosophie vom 15. bis zum 17. Jahrhundert', Studium Generale, 1960, 13: 670-682; P. 0.
Kristeller, The philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943; and E. E.
Maechling, 'Light metaphysics in the natural philosophy of Francesco Patrizi da Cherso', MPhil thesis,
University of London, 1977.
92 This is a prevalent notion and forms the background to the confusion between medical spirits and the
soul as described by Walker in the works cited in note 3 above, and suggested in the works by Mendelsohn,
Frank, McKie, and Mani cited in note 79 above. Perhaps the clearest example is to be found in the
metaphysicsofFrancesco Patrizi daCherso, see Maechling, op. cit., note91 above: and Benjamin Brickman,
An introduction to Francesco Patrizis 'Nova de universisphilosphia', New York, Columbia University [PhD
thesis], 1941.
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I had as willingly have heard Cartesius tell me any dream else that ever came into his Brain: For
this I greatly despise: And wonder not that any man is ignorant ofthe nature ofSpirits, who is so
grossly ignorant ofthe igneous analogical Nature as he was ... Really when I read how far you
haveescaped thedelusions ofCartesianism, I am sorry that you yet stick in so gross a part ofit as
this is; when he that knoweth no more than motion in the Nature of Fire, which is the active
principle by which mental and sensitive Nature operateth on Man, and Bruits and Vegetables,
and all thepassive Elements, (ifitbenot ipsaforma telluris)and all thevisible actionsin this lower
World areperformed, what can that mans Philosophy beworth? I therefore return yourCounsel,
study more thoroughly the Nature of Aethereal Fire.93
Theassociation ofthisneo-Platonic tradition withmedical theories aboutthenature
ofspirits, to which D. P. Walker has alerted us, can now be seen to be fundamental to
Richard Baxter's pneumatology. Glisson, however, did not need to single out fire as
the active principle in nature since he held all matter to be more or less active. As
Glissonwasevidently Baxter's majorsource, it is hardly surprising that we find Baxter
equivocating between spirit as fire or as substance endowed by God with perceptive,
appetitive, and motive faculties.94 In spite ofthis ambiguity one thing isclear; Baxter's
theology was strongly influenced by current medical theories.
CONCLUSIONS
There is evidence to suggest that Richard Baxter was personally acquainted with
Francis Glisson who was physician (as Baxter himself tell us) to his close friend and
neighbour, SirMatthew Hale.95 Thiswouldexplain Baxter's familiarity with Glisson's
philosophical ideas. But Baxter himself believed that familiarity with Glisson's
philosophy was rare. Hewaseven unaware ofMore'sattack on Glisson in the Epistola
altera since he admonished More:
I marvel thatwhen you havedealt with somanysortsofDissenters you meddle notwith so subtile
apiece asthatold Doctor'sde Vita Naturae: I have talktwithdivershigh pretenders to Philosophy
hereofthe newstrain, andasktthem theirjudgement ofDr. Glissons Book,and I found that none
of them understood it, but neglected it as too hard for them, and yet contemned it.96
More, naturally enough, was delighted to put his adversary right. In his anonymous
commentary on Bishop Rust's Discourse oftruth, More said of himself
that the Doctor has not only read that subtile Piece of Doctor Glissons, but understands so
thoroughly his Hypothesis, that he has solidly and substantially confuted it. Which he did in a
faithful regard to Religion. For that Hypothesis, ifit were true, were as safe, ifnot a safer Refuge
93 Baxter, Qfthe nature ofspirits, op. cit., note 71 above. pp. 57-59. Baxter is returning More's counsel
because More had urged Baxter to abandon his neo-Platonic view offire in favourofthe Cartesian account.
See More, Letter to a learnedpsychopyri.s, op. cit., note 71 above, pp. 226-230.
94 For instances ofthis equivocation see Baxter, Of the nature ofSpirits, op. cit., note 71 above, sig. A3r,
and. 10, but the whole discussion reflects Baxter's uncertainty (as he freely admitted, see note 90 above). 94Thefriendship between Baxterand Hale wasdocumented in Richard Baxter, Additional notes on thelqk
and death of Sir Matthew" Hale, London, for Richard Janeway, 1682, reprinted in Hale, op. cit., note 73
above. While describing Hale's death, Baxter tells us that "When he found his belly swell, his breath and
strength much abate, and his face and flesh decay, hecheerfully received the sentence ofdeath: and though
Dr. Glisson, by mere oximel squilliticum, seemed awhile to ease him, yet that also soon failed him . .', p. 92.
(Oximel squilliticum is a composition of vinegar flavoured with squills or sea-onions and honey; it is
intended to be both diuretic and expectorant.)
96 Baxter, Of'the nature of spirits, op. cit., note 71 above, p. 6.
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for Atheists, then the mere Mechanick Philosophie is: ... But God be thanked Dr. H.
More ... has perfectly routed that fond and foul Hypothesis of Dr. Glisson, and I dare say is
sorry that so good and old a Knight errant in Theologie and Philosophie as Mr Richard Baxter
seems to be, should become benighted, as in a wood, at the Close ofhis daies, in this most horrid
dark Harbour and dismal Receptacle or Rendezvous of wretched Atheists.97
The time is long overdue for a further reappraisal of Glisson's influence. Arrigo
Pacchi, in his survey Cartesio in Inghilterra, has said that contemporaries reacted to
Glisson's philosophy with "almost total silence".98 However, as we have seen, three of
the leading theologians in England, Baxter, More, and Cudworth, responded
forcefully to his work. Henry Oldenburg gave a careful review of the De natura
substantiaeenergetica in his Philosophical Transactionsand Robert Boyle regarded itas
sufficiently threatening to his own natural philosophical enterprise to make it a target
for criticism in his Free inquiry into the vulgarly receiv'd notion ofnature.99 There are
strong indications, also, that Glisson's philosophical ideas influenced Leibniz and
Locke, though the evidence has yet to be properly assessed.100 It is clear, at any rate,
that Glisson's views were not dismissed by contemporaries as the irrelevant ramblings
of a dotard., but were noticed as an important new system of philosophy.
One final point should be re-emphasized. I have argued that medical theories played
an important role in the pneumatology of Henry More and Richard Baxter. More
responded in his writings to Harvey, Wharton, and Regius as well as Glisson, and he
even adapted J. B. van Helmont's concept of archeus for his own use. Baxter drew
many of his beliefs about the nature of life and the soul from Jean Fernel, the
neo-Platonizing medical tradition of"psychopyrism", to retain More's aptneologism,
andthephilosophyofFrancisGlisson.101 Theimportanceofsuchmedicalconcernsfor
contemporary developments in philosophical theology, therefore, should not be
underestimated. I hope I have shown, also, that Glisson's one and only
97 More, Digression, note 72 above, pp. 192-193. More obviously went to some trouble to introduce the
puns into this piece, it would be a pity if the reader missed them.
98 Pacchi, op. cit., note 52 above, p. 151.
99 Phil. Trans., 1672,7: 5076-5077. Robert Boyle, A.freeenquiry into the vulgarl/ receiv'dnotion ofnature,
London, H. Clark forJohn Taylor, 1658/6. Themajortargets for Boyle'sattack werelatter-day Aristotelians
and the Cambridge Platonists. See McGuire, op. cit., note90above. What has not been noticed so faris that
Boyle wasalso concerned to argue that "Inanimate bodies can have neither Appetites nor Hatreds" (p. 268).
It has been suggested that Boyle was also attacking a specific group of"pagan naturalists" in this work but
evidence for this is tendentious, see J. R. Jacob, 'Boyle's atomism and the Restoration assault on pagan
naturalism', Social Studs. Sci, 1978, 8: 211-233.
l00 For his influence on Leibniz see Sprengel and Remusat, both cited in note 6 noted above; and H.
Marion, Franciscus Glissoniusquidde naturasubstantiae seu vitanaturaesenserit et utrum Leihnitio denatura
substantiae cogitanti quidquam contulerit, Paris, G. Bailliere, 1880.
10l More, Immortality, mentions Regius, for example, at 79, 92, 96; Wharton at 93-94; and J. B. van
Helmont at 79-80, 171, 174, and 195. Harvey appears in the notes to the 4th ed., note 39 above, pp. 97, 127.
More uses Helmont's concept ofarcheus in the notes to his poem, Ps chozoia, see Grosart (editor), op. cit.,
note 29 above, p. 139; and in the notes to the4th ed. ofthe Immortality ofthesoul, note 39 above, p. 10, and
elsewhere throughout his works. Jean Fernel is cited by Baxter in his Methodus theologiae christianae .
note 70 above, p. 176. Baxter also had a copy of Fernel's Universa medicina, Paris, 1567, in his personal
library. Indeed, therewereasignificant numberofmedical books in hislibrary butonly onework byGlisson:
Anatomia hepatis. For the complete list ofBaxter's book collection see Geoffrey F. Nuttall, 'A transcript of
Richard Baxter's library catalogue; a bibliographical note', J. Ecclesiastical Hist., 1951 and 1952, 2: 207-21:
and 3: 74-100. There is a concentration of medical works at 3: 94-95.
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"philosophical" book cannot be dismissed as merely a physician's dilettantish
excursion out ofhis own field into philosophy, which adds nothing to my claim that
medicalconcepts were important to contemporary philosophy. When Glisson wrote,
there was no sharp distinction, as there is today, between philosophy and science, or
rather philosophy and natural philosophy. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that
Glisson's system of philosophy was specifically and quite explicitly developed to
provide theunderpinningforhismedical ideas on theirritability or natural perception
oftissueevenwheretherearenonervesorsensoryorganspresent. Glisson's Treatiseon
theenergeticnatureofsubstance, therefore,wasanewsystemofphilosophywhichgrew
directlyoutofthepioneeringphysiological work pursued byoneofHarvey'smostable
successors. In view of the contemporary recognition of the importance of medical
theories to a crucial philosophical debate about the nature ofthe soul and the validity
ofdualism, it was inevitable that Glisson's medical philosophy should strike leading
thinkers as a work of fundamental importance.
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